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Abstract 
This paper focuses on Mass Observation (MO)’s morale work, commissioned 
by the British Government over the period 1939–41. It examines the ways in 
which MO’s earlier collecting practices were recomposed through its research 
into civilian morale, and linked up with national centres of calculation, in particular 
the Ministry of Information (MoI). We explore the associations through which 
civilian morale was established, simultaneously, as an autonomous object of 
knowledge and as a particular field of intervention. As an object of knowledge, 
morale posited the existence of a dynamic affective ‘atmosphere’ associated with 
collective everyday life, which could be calibrated through various social scientific 
methods. As a particular field of intervention, technicians of morale postulated 
that this atmosphere might be regulated through various policy instruments. 
This paper traces the ways in which MO practices were implicated along these 
two axes in the emergence of civilian morale as a domain warranting the state’s 
‘constant attention and supervision’.
Keywords: Mass Observation, civilian morale, liberal governmentality.
[Mass-Observers] will be the meteorological stations from whose reports a 
weather-map of popular feeling can be compiled.
Charles Madge and Tom Harrisson, Mass-Observation (1937: 30)
The government should be fully aware of all the trends in civilian morale. They 
need an accurate machine for measuring such trends; a war barometer.
Mass Observation, War Begins at Home (1940: v)
Focusing on Mass Observation (MO)’s morale work commissioned by the British Government 
over the period 1939–41, this paper examines how the organization’s early practices of data 
collection were recomposed and linked up with national centres of calculation – in particular, 
the Ministry of Information (MoI). Investigating Mass Observation’s work for the Ministry, the 
paper traces how civilian morale was established, simultaneously, as an autonomous object 
of knowledge and as a field of intervention. As an object of knowledge, morale posited the 
existence of a dynamic affective ‘atmosphere’ associated with collective everyday life which 
could be calibrated through various social scientific methods.1 As a field of intervention it was 
postulated that this atmosphere, if its dynamics were properly understood, could be regulated 
through various policy instruments, from programmes of propaganda to policies of compulsion 
directed variously at rumour and ‘dangerous talk’; gasmask carrying; evacuation planning; 
post-Blitz recovery, and so on. To this end this paper reviews how Mass Observation practices 
were implicated in the emergence of morale as an affective atmosphere warranting the state’s 
‘constant attention and supervision’ (MO 1940, War Begins at Home: 419).
We proceed in two parts. The first considers the emergence of civilian morale as an 
entity which rendered the affective atmosphere of wartime Britain knowable and so manipulable. 
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This involves the ways in which morale came to designate a general psycho-social condition 
whose contours could be made visible in various knowledge formulations concerned with 
‘the public mind’ and ‘private opinion’. The concern here is with the contexts in which morale 
emerged as a new ‘transactional reality’ mediating relations between the governing and the 
governed. This section, then, addresses the question: How did the subjective disposition of 
a population emerge as this object of intense scrutiny: that is, what was the problematic in 
which morale emerged as an answer?
The second part considers the particular techniques of persuasion and compulsion 
advanced by MO to target morale and the respective relations of these different techniques 
to the problematic of liberal government (Foucault 2008). Drawing on the recommendations 
put forward by MO in both its evaluations of existing levels of morale and its assessments 
of the instruments for intervening in those levels in particular urban contexts, this section 
considers how the government of morale was implicated in different modalities of power. 
Firstly, as it exercised a form of bio-power concerned with the productivity and sacrifice of the 
civilian body. Secondly, as it walked a line between liberal and illiberal forms of rule in which 
the administration of morale oscillated between a concern with the responsibilisation of the 
citizen-subject’s freedom and more directly coercive measures. Thirdly, as it targeted working 
class populations through two different modes of government, cf., those whose mechanisms 
worked via ‘the public’ by appealing to the voluntary actions of the citizenry, and, those that 
operate via ‘the milieu’, altering the material environment in which that citizenry body is situated. 
This section, then, is concerned with how morale came to be folded into the problematic of 
liberal rule. In particular, with ‘the agenda and non-agenda’ of morale policy (Foucault 2008: 
12) – that is, with the question of what could safely be the subject of intervention on the one 
hand, and on the other, as historian of the MoI, Ian McLaine, put it ‘what it was best to leave 
alone’ (1979: 10).2
MO completed its first report for the MoI upon the outbreak of war in September 1939, 
and delivered its final Ministerial ‘collaboration’ in November 1941 (Hubble 2006: 167, 187).3 
The work for the Ministry represented a new kind of application for the quotidian investigations 
of the organization founded in 1937 by Tom Harrisson, Charles Madge and Humphrey Jennings, 
who had energetically imagined that MO’s work would be significantly distinct from other social 
science research.4 Writing in 1971, Harrisson reflected upon the ‘double-sided approach’ which 
distinguished the MO method: firstly, observation of fellow citizens by ‘trained mass-observers’ 
and, secondly, a panel of volunteers who could contribute ‘personal documentation and random 
observation’, in practice through diaries and survey and directive responses (1971: 398–9). 
These instruments which had, in peacetime, aimed to gather data on the ‘habit, emotion, 
opinion’ of the masses were recomposed and, as part of the MoI work, redirected at morale 
(MO 1944, #2116: [10]).5 In 1942 Bob Willcock – then director of MO – suggested that the 
‘complex machinery’ MO developed for measuring ‘people’s behaviour, their subjective feelings, 
their worries, frustrations, hopes, desires, expectations and fears’ was in fact ‘strengthened 
by the experience of war’, resulting in its increasing refinement as a method of data collection 
(MO 1942, #1415: 21–2). 
The ethnographically informed epistemic procedures and collecting practices implicated 
in MO’s data gathering machinery have a museological dimension which was significant for the 
project’s involvement in the government of morale. In observing how ‘MO framed its project 
as a “museological” one’, Rodney Harrison (2014: 228) has drawn out the ways in which MO 
brought together ethnographic methods of collecting and assembling with mechanisms of 
individual and collective self-watching. These mechanisms were central to the development of 
public museums as spaces of liberal government, as Tony Bennett (1995; 2004) demonstrates; 
and key to the emergence of public archives as spaces ‘intimately concerned with collecting 
information about the condition of “the people”’, in Patrick Joyce’s argument, and so necessarily 
implicated in the formation of the liberal subject as one of self-surveillance and self-government 
(1999: 40). The question which emerges is how did Mass Observation turn to morale to provide 
a governmental optic on the condition of the Britain’s civilian population?6
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The Morale Problematic: Total war and the ‘atmosphere of ordinary Britain’7
The fortifications of our minds … without constant attention and supervision by 
skilled and trained technicians … remain the fortifications of pre-war. But Nazi 
Germany lead the world in mind-sweeping, and morale-influencing.
Mass Observation, War Begins at Home (1940: 419; emphasis in original)8
As modernity’s quintessential total war, WWII was ‘the first global aerial war’9 in which both the 
Allies and the Axis strategies were directed as much at ‘the morale of the civilian populations of 
the enemy nations’ as they were at strictly military targets – devastatingly through air-raids and 
deviously through airwaves (Osborne and Rose 1999: 380). As such, morale was identified as 
an element intimately linked to ‘the military fortunes of a nation’ and was increasingly thought of 
in strategic terms (380). If morale was being assailed by the nation’s enemies, the state must 
be able to protect, preserve and promote it. If morale was to be so fostered, the state needed 
‘to assess it and understand it, in order to develop, adjust and evaluate policies towards it’ 
(380). The question arises, then: how did the emotional disposition of the civilian population 
emerge as this object of intense administrative scrutiny and military salience? 
To begin to address this question it is useful to turn to an analytics of government. 
This is an analytics concerned with the epistemic and the administrative procedures through 
which particular entities come to be. On Mitchell Deans’ characterization, it is a mode of inquiry 
‘concerned with an analysis of the specific conditions under which particular entities emerge, 
exist and change’ (1999: 20–1). Central to this analytics is Foucault’s notion of ‘transactional 
realities’ (réalité de transaction) (2008: 297). With this term Foucault designates:
those transactional and transitional figures that we call civil society, madness, 
and so on, which, although they have not always existed are nonetheless real, 
[and] are born precisely from the interplay of relations of power and everything 
which constantly eludes them, at the interface, so to speak, of governors and 
governed (297).
This section focuses on the conditions under which morale came to be – concentrating on the 
emergence of the apparatus that bought this entity into existence; stabilizing it as an object of 
knowledge; and intervening in it as a field of government. This section, then, is concerned with 
the forms of knowledge that made morale visible and rendered it calculable and programmable 
such that it came to serve as an interface between the governors and the governed in wartime 
Britain. It takes as its point of departure the contention that the emergence of morale was 
simultaneously a morale emergency.
In 1938 a committee of psychiatrists submitted a report to the British Ministry of Health, 
which considered the psychological consequences of the sustained bombing of civilian 
populations. The report anticipated:
the psychiatric would exceed the physical casualties by three to one, which, on 
the basis of the government’s estimates of killed and wounded, would mean 
between three and four million cases of acute panic, hysteria and neurosis 
during the first six months of war (McLaine 1979: 26).
With these predictions the report confirmed the doxa that had been established in the mental 
health profession by the mid-1920s, where evidence from the 1914–18 war came to confirm 
the inevitability of an epidemic of neurosis among civilians as a result of air attack. Faced with 
these prospects the report called for a complex and extensive psychiatric apparatus to minister 
to the psychologically shattered. However, preparation for the remedial was not the only strategy 
anticipating this epidemic. Equally pressing was a consideration of the prophylactic measures 
that might fortify ‘the public mind’ against an air war intent on breaking civilian morale to the 
point of capitulation.
If the Ministry of Health was charged with anticipating the psychiatric consequences of 
air war, it was the Ministry of Information that was accorded responsibility for the pre-emption 
of these effects. This Ministry, if it was to protect morale against the damaging psychological 
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consequences of air raids, needed to come to know the emotional life of the civil population, 
its ‘group feeling’, if that life was to be rendered calculable and securable. On Nikolas Rose’s 
account this is the precise moment of ‘the birth of a social psychiatry’; one registered in the 
Lancet in August 1940 by the director of the London Clinic of Psychoanalysis, Edward Clover:
For the first time in history a government has officially recognized that the state 
of public opinion is as important an index of the health of the community as a 
full anamnesis in the case of individual illness … the Ministry of Information has 
established that group feeling is a medico-psychological concern and that it calls 
for instruments of precision in diagnosis (cited in Rose 1998: 134).
In the event, the psychiatrists’ predications failed to eventuate. There was no significant 
increase in neurosis or other mental illnesses evident during the war in Britain. As another 
mental health practitioner put it: ‘The incidence of genuine psychiatric air-raid casualties has 
been much lower than might have been expected; the average previously healthy citizen has 
proved remarkably adjustable’ (Felix Brown, cited in McLaine 1979: 108). While these anxieties 
of mass neurosis proved unfounded, they did nevertheless have their own effects: the emotional 
landscape of the civilian population emerged as a zone of intense governmental scrutiny. 
Numerous inscription devices collated the link between morale and bombing and translated 
this relationship into calculable forms in reports, statistics, graphs and other documentation 
– together this contributed to an emerging apparatus with an increasing capacity to map the 
population’s emotional topography. The Ministry of Information was key to this process, as 
both a centre of collection and of calculation.10
Yet, as documentation from the Ministry made clear, assembling morale’s diagnostic 
instruments was no simple matter. It faced a significant challenge: precisely, how was civilian 
morale to be rendered knowable and, consequently, made actionable? As McLaine summed 
it, the Ministry was ‘working in virtually uncharted territory’ (1979: 23). The answer saw the 
development of ‘machinery for the collection of intelligence’ in the form of the Collecting 
Division (subsequently Home Intelligence), whose brief was to provide a constant monitoring 
and assessment of civilian morale and to distribute this information to other government 
departments (22).
Charged with this injunction to know the subjective interiority of the civilian population 
so that it might be linked to objectives of the state, in 1940 the newly appointed director of the 
MoI’s Collecting Division, Mary Adams, proposed the creation of a ‘morale barometer’ (cited in 
Hubble 2006: 179–80). Outlining her proposals for ‘the structure and functions’ of this division, 
Adams identified that: ‘[Its] immediate tasks were to supply the Ministry [MoI] itself with routine 
monthly and ad hoc reports on matters of urgency and on the effectiveness of propaganda’. 
As she added: ‘A continuous flow of information is required … to study immediate reactions to 
specific events as well as to create a barometer for the measurement of opinion, on questions 
likely to be continuously important’ (cited in McLaine 1979: 50).
There were three primary sources that the MoI drew upon in its enterprise ‘to turn 
morale into writing and make it legible’ (Rose 1990: 28–9): its own Home Intelligence/Collecting 
Division, which itself gathered data from various sources including regional staff with local 
contacts, the BBC Listeners’ Research Unit, the Postal and Telegraph Censors and police 
duty room reports; the National Institute for Economic and Social Research’s Wartime Social 
Survey (WSS); and, in spite of ‘some disquiet concerning its methods’, Mass Observation – in 
fact the initiative leading to the establishment of the WSS was ‘to act as a check’ on MO data 
(Hubble 2006: 179). However, as McLaine notes, ‘the Ministry placed a heavy reliance on the 
work performed by Mass-Observation’ in spite of these reservations (1979: 52). Indeed, Adams 
was to convey to Treasury that MO reports ‘have now become an essential part of the whole 
machinery of Home Intelligence’ (cited in Hubble 2006: 182). In this, then, MO came to make 
a significant contribution to this organization, assisting in the MoI’s ‘duty … to [interpret] the 
public mind to the Government, and act as [a] clearing house for information about changing 
habits and beliefs’ (MO 1940, #507: 4).
In supplying its expertise to the MoI’s emerging ‘morale barometer’, MO’s work with 
the Ministry took place in the context of, and contributed to, the processes through which 
citizenship had ‘acquired a subjective form’ (Rose 1990: 32). MO turned to the calibration 
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of the affective atmosphere of wartime Britain and became imbricated in ‘the transactional 
reality’ that emerged as civilian morale. Summarizing the developments in Britain over the late 
1930s and 1940s, Rose writes: ‘From this point forth, winning the war, and winning the peace, 
required the active engagement of the civilian in the social and political process, a shaping 
of wills, consciences, and aspirations, to forge social solidarity and individual responsibilities’ 
(32). He continues: ‘As citizenship became a psychological matter, the psyche of the citizen 
was discovered as a new continent for psychological knowledge and for the deployment of the 
professional skills of the technicians of subjectivity’ (32). Morale emerged as a key mechanism 
by which the governors might get a hold of this newly defined psycho-social territory, and so 
optimize the wellbeing of the citizenry while simultaneously serving the national interest and 
war effort. In linking up its expertise on the subjectivity of the ordinary people with the state 
apparatus, MO was implicated in the conquest of this continental discovery: the psyche of 
the citizenry – ‘the mysterious, unfathomed depths of consciousness which the Government 
must learn to understand and exploit’ (MO 1940, #298: 12).11 Or, as it was termed by MO, ‘the 
public mind’ (MO 1941, #568: [1]).12
The Stratified Subject: ‘The public mind’ and the production of subjectivity
… to get at the public mind … we must distinguish several levels of opinion 
and behaviour.
Mass Observation, ‘What is Public Opinion?’ (1940, #361: 9)
As posited by MO, the subject of morale was stratified: it was a subject of surface and depth. 
In its formulation of morale, MO documentation was at pains to draw a qualitative difference 
between public and private opinion – a distinction which it contended was consequential for 
the measurement and interpretation of morale. One report claimed: ‘In generalisations about 
morale, one must always bear in mind the vital difference between what people say, and 
especially what they say to a stranger (the interviewer), and what they are thinking deep down’ 
(MO 1940, #89: [1]). In this, a methodological problematic was established which highlighted 
the limitations of procedures that would rely solely on public opinion to gauge morale. Refining 
MO’s ‘investigative machinery’, a subsequent report to the MoI advanced an analysis precisely 
in terms of surfaces and depths. It contended:
[The reported] generalisations are essentially based on detailed facts, but 
also go below the surface layer of these facts. That is now an essential part of 
understanding morale. It has always been very misleading to rely on material 
of the interview and spoken comment type. That has never given more than 
public opinion[;] the done thing …. It is private opinion which matters (MO 1940, 
#222: 16).
This notion of morale, then, posited the citizen-subject not only as the bearer of surfaces and 
depths, but as one whose psychological veracity was only to be discovered in the latter. Harrisson’s 
academic publications of the time similarly worked to formalize this distinction between public 
and private opinion so that it was the interiority of the private, over the exteriority of the public, 
which had privileged access to the truth of morale. In contrast to the emerging methodological 
tools of British sociology – the social survey and the opinion poll, which offered competing 
cartographies of citizen subjectivity to MO’s more qualitative approaches13 – exponents of MO’s 
method lay claim to the expertise required to penetrate the interiorities of the citizen-subject, 
and so to lay bare the truth of what was hidden: the ‘unfathomed depths of consciousness’ of 
the ordinary Briton (MO 1940, #298: 12). And with it, the precise state of the subjectivity that 
lay under the mask of public opinion, which the government must access and exploit.
It is important to register what is at stake in this distinction between ‘public opinion’ 
and that which lies beneath, ‘private opinion’. In this formulation Harrisson looked to discredit 
the object of his social scientific rivals: public opinion.14 ‘Public opinion’ could only ever be 
a poor optic on morale; rather, the proper task of the social analyst was to understand the 
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dynamics of ‘private opinion’ and its public manifestations and implications. But more than 
this, ‘public opinion’ was not only a weak indicate of actual morale; it also had the potentiality 
to be dangerously repressive:
Civilian morale is to-day acclaimed by Admirals, Mayors, Ministers and journalists, 
as A1 ... this ballyhoo sanctions only a show of pleasure or reprisal, and makes 
it more difficult for people to express perfectly natural feelings of depression 
or distress. More and more, in recent months, emotions have been bottled up, 
and the [gulf] between public opinion and private opinion is again becoming 
dangerously enlarged .… The more compulsion and restriction, the more 
easily can tensions develop at the level of private opinion without ever being 
noticed on top. In such situations we have the elements of violent explosion, 
quite ‘unexpectedly’ released at some crisis moment (MO 1941, #568: 56, 66).
The ‘good government’ of morale was the management and minimization of the dissonance 
between public and private opinion, between external and ‘superficial’ public expression and 
internal and ‘deep’ private countenance, such that this volatile pressure did not gather in the 
affective atmosphere, and explode in an uncontrolled manner detrimental to both the individual 
subject and social order. A lack of understanding and a failure to ‘grasp’ the disposition of 
ordinary citizens was a recurring and prominent charge in the MO documentation against the 
nation’s political elites, with the governors regularly chastised for their inadequate knowledge 
of the governed and thus their poor management of civilian morale:
The whole situation of morale at the moment is dominated by the continuing lack 
of precise leadership …. Ministers and the Ministry of Information continue to 
show themselves emotionally unaware [and] administratively unready to handle 
or canalise the immensely powerful feelings which are surging beneath the 
surface of practically every individual in the island (1940, #242: [7]).15
MO’s research thus developed a precise correspondence between an exigency of Britain’s 
wartime government, and the subject of MO’s expertise, cultivating the emergence of morale 
as a previously obscured object of knowledge in service of rehabilitating a nation in crisis.
Governing Morale:  
The Problematic of Liberal Government: Morale and political rationality
We believe, from the material in this book, and from a great deal of other material 
which we have collected in the last two years, that the Government cannot afford 
to leave the civilian population without powerful leadership and constant attention.
Mass Observation, War Begins at Home (1940: 421)
This section is concerned with the political rationality of morale, specifically, the ways morale 
was figured in relation to the problematic of liberal government which, historically, has been 
constituted in the ‘principle of the self-limitation of government’: that of governing too little and 
too much (Foucault 2008: 19–21). We turn to MO arguments which consider how ‘good morale’ 
can be served, variously, by both policies of persuasion and compulsion. Here effective, efficient 
government of civilian morale was deemed to be that, which, in understanding the dynamics 
of ‘the public mind’, and comprehending ‘its inherent nature’, knows when liberal mechanisms 
of persuasion must give way to authoritarian forms of rule (and vice versa) if that mind is to 
be, simultaneously, relieved of its ‘bewilderment’, ‘panic’ and ‘uncertainty’ – characterized in 
the extreme by the atmosphere of blitzed cities – and, focused on the ‘endurance’, ‘hard work’ 
and ‘energy’ necessary to optimize the productivity of the war economy.16
Morale and Life Itself: ‘The public mind’ and the bio-political
It is bad morale to endanger your productive capacity, even if you are cheerful 
and heroic while you do it.
Mass Observation, ‘Morale in 1941.......’ (1941, #568: 11)
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Tyrus Miller has suggested that MO’s ‘Dream Project’ – an investigation which sought to collect 
and analyze the dreams of ordinary citizens – was a project concerned with ‘the affective 
experience of biopolitical governmentality’ (2001: 42). This is a useful formulation to draw on 
in relation to MO’s work on ‘the public mind’ and morale. All the more so, in that as MO refined 
the concept of morale its affective dimensions were linked with explicitly bio-political concerns 
targeting ‘life itself’. That is, on the one hand, with the productivity of the population’s labour-
power and the responsibility of the citizenry for prudence with regard to the preservation of life; 
and, on the other, with the cultivation of a preparedness for self-sacrifice in the interests of that 
aggregate. The first of these dimensions is illustrated in a 1941 report for the MoI, where the 
question ‘what is good morale?’ was answered in the following terms. Good morale involved 
‘maintaining and producing an offensive spirit as well as a defensive spirit’, with an economic 
inflection added to the psychological definition: ‘primarily good morale to-day means hard work’ 
(MO 1941, #568: 6–8). In this way morale was linked to ‘efficiency’, understood ‘as gaining 
the maximum war effort from the population’ (Beaven and Griffiths 1999: 75).
If civilian morale was a mechanism by which to extract surplus from the population in 
conditions of a war economy, it was also a mechanism which hailed the prudent subject. In 
the same document, good morale was identified (at least in part) as a defence against risky 
behaviour which would imperil the citizen-worker’s body – that biological substrate for ‘hard 
work’ – and, thus, the potentiality of that subject’s labour-power:17
It must be the responsibility of leadership to get the citizens to take precautions 
in their own interests. If they are failing to take the precautions there is something 
badly wrong. At present, for instance, on the whole absence of gasmask 
carrying is a sign of good morale. But not to carry your gasmask might equally 
be interpreted as bad morale. It is bad morale to endanger your productive 
capacity (MO 1941, #568: 11).
However, good morale in MO’s formulation is not only a mechanism that would seek to secure 
life by responsibilising citizens into precautionary habits so as to optimize productivity. Perhaps 
paradoxically, good morale also prepared the ground for the forfeiting of that life. For example, 
in a subsequent document morale was defined in the following terms:
By morale we mean primarily not only the determination to carry on, but also 
determination to carry on with the utmost energy, a determination based on a 
realisation of the facts and with a readiness for many minor and some major 
sacrifices, including, if necessary, the sacrifice of life itself (MO 1941, #600: [i]).
Variously configured to serve the interests of the collective and, ultimately, the interests of the 
state, MO’s affective formulations of morale had a complex, even conflicted relation with the 
bio-political. As the next section will demonstrate, a similar equivocality was also reflected in 
the organization’s analysis of two modalities of rule.
Liberal and Illiberal Rule: Persuasion and compulsion
This book will frequently show conflict or confusion between the voluntary 
principle of peace and compulsory principle of war.
Mass Observation, War Begins at Home (1940: 1)
The State has two methods: persuasion and compulsion. It is rightly reluctant, 
at all times, to abandon the one and resort to the other.
Mass Observation, Home Propaganda ([1941]: [i])
MO documentation for the period with which this paper is concerned was marked by a 
significant level of deliberation about the effective management of morale, which would 
necessarily walk a line between policies of persuasion and compulsion. Here MO’s knowledge 
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practices became imbricated in the problematic of liberal government: a problematic, to follow 
Foucault’s characterization, which must distinguish between practices of governing through 
liberal modalities of power that would seek to rule through liberty, and practices which seek to 
govern through other, illiberal means, marking the limits to freedom’s rule. That is, in this case, 
practices which govern through the principle of compulsion, such as conscription, curfews, 
rationing, and so on. The discussion below traces the logic by which MO argued, on the one 
hand, for occasions where it was necessary to limit government in circumstances where the 
implementation of illiberal forms of rule generated conditions counter to the aims of good 
government; and, on the other, the reverse: those instances where illiberal forms of rule ought 
to be implemented since they were in the interests of the effective and efficient government 
of the population’s welfare.
In 1940 the British Government campaigned and legislated against ‘dangerous talk’ 
on the grounds that ‘those who spread gloom and despondency do definite harm’ to civilian 
morale and the war effort generally (cited in MO 1940, #286: 13). Reviewing this attempt to 
control rumour and despondency through legislation, MO contended that such policy was 
demonstrative of the governors’ inadequate knowledge of working class culture. Implemented 
with no ethnographic understanding of the function of such talk in British society, legislation for 
its prohibition could only be detrimental for securing ‘good morale’. Without this knowledge, 
policy-makers failed to recognize a key mechanism of self-regulation within that society: the 
role of argumentative and humorous conversation. MO maintained such conversation was 
a necessary ‘safety valve in our culture’, and as such, this mechanism by which affective 
energies were released was posited as something like a natural condition of civil society; 
cf., ‘a British habit’, a part of ‘the British tradition’ (14). In this instance, then, illiberal rule was 
cast as an unwarranted interference in popular conduct. Not only ineffectual and unlikely to 
‘defeat defeatism’, it was also counter-productive to its wider aims, since it worked against civil 
society’s own mechanisms for maintaining morale (20). The report contended that ‘dangerous 
talk’ should instead be targeted through techniques that sought to get hold of citizens’ conduct 
via appeals to their voluntary actions; that is, through the persuasive practices of propaganda.
While propaganda was closely involved in efforts to modulate voluntary conduct, as will 
be considered in more detail in the next section, it was also a practice which could be used to 
forge a connection between liberal and illiberal modalities of power. MO reported that people 
were willing to forfeit freedoms when fully informed of the need for their forfeiture:
That is why this legislation has had a disturbing effect. People do not resent 
restrictions in wartime, so long as they know where they are and what it all 
means, and so long as the basic elements of freedom do not appear to be 
overwhelmingly involved (28).
Thus propaganda could play a role in communicating imperative; accordingly, the conditions 
under which citizens consented to coercion and were prepared to surrender freedoms in the 
interests of national security and welfare were a regular concern in MO documentation of the 
early 1940s.
MO was active in investigating situations where illiberal forms of rule were, in its view, 
in the interests of good government. MO aimed to situate and quantify public tolerance for 
authoritarian rule, and its research sought to establish as an objective truth the existence 
of a demotic – if not democratic – desire for forms of compulsion in particular contexts. For 
example, in a MO report canvassing popular views on ‘the responsibility of the citizen’, it was 
stated: ‘As the average citizen sees it, in wartime this responsibility consists mainly of doing 
what he is told or urgently asked to do’ (1941, #568: 9–10). Evidence for this claim pointed 
to MO surveys that discovered widespread support for the conscription of women’s labour 
and other forms of compulsion in relation to evacuations, fire-spotting, air raid precautions, 
and so on.18 Such findings could translate into policy advice, and MO urged the Government 
to action in the case of fire-spotting: ‘these responses suggest that the moment is ideal for 
the introduction of such regulations’ (MO 1941, #536: 4). Accompanying this advice was a 
strategic recommendation for regulation which demonstrates MO’s dexterity in negotiating its 
seemingly paradoxical investment in liberal and illiberal rule: ‘it should continue to be stressed 
that compulsion is only being used where the voluntary system has been tried and failed’ (4).19
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As a form of expertise in the service of the state, then, MO was concerned with 
discovering how, under conditions of total war, citizen-workers’ were, on the one hand, 
amenable to particular practices of persuasion which sought to get a hold of subjects’ 
conduct through their voluntary actions, and, on the other, practices directed not at 
free actions, but at governing through the principle of compulsion. Thus the question 
arises: by what mechanisms do practices that would seek to direct the citizenry through 
persuasion and compulsion get a hold of their conduct? The following section addresses 
this question by considering how morale came to target the civilian population via two 
mechanisms of government: the public and the milieu.
Morale Emergency: Public and milieu
In the event of an invasion it will be essential for the Government to be able to 
control the civil population absolutely – not through the police or the military, 
who will be largely on other work, but through the radio, through notices, through 
word-of-mouth instruction …. It is here that propaganda comes in.
Mass Observation, ‘A New Attitude to the Problems of Civilian Morale’ (1940, #193: [1]–9)
At present, not only is there little local lead, but the simple, material activities 
necessary for restoring some sort of shape to life after a blitz have been rendered 
too complicated by official machinery and by a frequent lack of understanding 
of the working-class mind in emergency.
Mass Observation, ‘Summary of Talk to the British Psychological Society … by Tom 
Harrisson’ (1941, #926: 6)
In Security, Population, Territory, Foucault describes two mechanisms through which a population 
might be governed: respectively, through practice which addresses the population as a public, 
and practice that attends its milieu (2007: 20–1, 75). For Foucault, the public ‘is the population 
seen under the aspects of its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of behaviour, customs, 
fears, prejudices, and requirements: it is what one gets a hold on through education, campaigns 
and convictions’ (75). The milieu is associated with the apparatus of security, which Foucault 
identifies as one of three mechanisms of power, alongside sovereignty and discipline. For 
Foucault security is the dominant contemporary mode of power, and examples of its techniques 
include criminal statistics and medical campaigns: it is a mechanism wherein probability, 
calculation and optimization are enlisted in order to administer ‘an indefinite series of mobile 
elements’ (6, 20). The milieu is the space in which this series emerges, and can be managed:
The milieu is a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live 
in it …. the milieu appears as a field of intervention in which, instead of affecting 
individuals as a set of legal subjects capable of voluntary actions—which would 
be the case of sovereignty—and instead of affecting them as a multiplicity of 
organisms, of bodies capable of performances, and of requited performances—as 
in discipline—one tries to affect, precisely, a population. I mean a multiplicity 
of individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically 
bound to the materiality within which they live (21).
So in contrast to governing via the public, which seeks to get hold of the population through 
persuasive techniques targeting habits, customs and beliefs, governing via the milieu seeks 
to get hold of the population by manipulating the materiality that conditions its existence. In 
being governed through its relations to its milieu, population, then, does not concern subjects 
of law, or bodies for discipline, but rather a biological aggregate with particular regularities. 
MO’s analysis of blitzed urban centres demonstrates a population being targeted via both of 
these mechanisms under conditions of emergency.20
When German aerial attacks were extended to provincial English cities in November 
1940, MO dispatched Observers to report on the immediate aftermath of the Blitz in various 
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regional contexts.21 Mackay has observed that almost all of the reports MO made on blitzed 
provincial cities ‘reveal the inadequacies of the [Government’s] provision’ (2002: 73). Disrupted 
by air raids, many citizen-workers found themselves in situations of radical uncertainty, where 
existing modes of conduct no longer seemed to hold. Addressing the British Psychological 
Society in 1941, Harrisson summarized the findings of his organization’s research to date: ‘In 
every blitzed town studied by Mass-Observation this has been a dominating feeling; one of 
individual relapse, bewilderment, and uncertainty as to what to do, how to behave’ (MO 1941, 
#926: 3). MO reports contended that in the extraordinary conditions of the blitzed city, the 
ordinary citizen was left without a template for behaviour. This condition of radical despondency 
was exasperated all the more because citizens were left without leadership – without guidance 
as to what was expected of them: ‘There was no role for the civilian. Ordinary people had 
no idea what they should do’ (MO 1940, #495: 2). The effect on civilian morale Harrisson 
observed was shattering:
This lack of any plan or code of behaviour for the civilian in air raids gives 
[civilians] not only a feeling of helplessness, but also a feeling that everything is 
broken …. in Coventry there was among many people a helpless, hopeless sort 
of feeling that the town itself was killed, and there was nothing to be done but 
to get out of it … ‘Coventry is finished’, ‘Coventry is dead’ (MO 1941, #926: 4).
Harrisson opined this lack of instruction contributed directly to the irregular movement of urban 
populations that followed air raids and the ensuing chaos the exodus produced. ‘It is largely 
to this [lack of instruction], and not to actual physical fear, that the terrible, random evacuation 
of 50% of the population … must be attributed’ (3–4). Harrisson lamented: ‘If there had only 
been some kind of coherent direction’ as to the ‘accepted code of behaviour … to follow – 
there would have been far less alarm and depression’ (3). For the authors of these reports 
this situation of perplexity as to how to conduct oneself in the absence of clear leadership was 
indicative of both: (i) the failure of present propaganda strategies and the need to build the 
pedagogical dimensions of morale management; and (ii) the breakdown in the mechanisms 
of security by which the circulation of bodies and things were to be regulated and so manage 
the materialities of working class life in emergency.
Firstly, then, MO articulated the authority’s failure to effectively govern through the public; 
that is, via the persuasive techniques of propaganda that should manage a population’s ‘opinions, 
ways of doing things, forms of behaviour, customs’. In this the governors had inadequate expertise 
on ‘the public mind’ and thus suffered from a ‘lack of understanding of the working-class mind 
in emergency’ (6). In his talk to the British Psychological Society, Harrisson highlighted this 
gap in knowledge by emphasizing the social distance between classes. Commenting on the 
consequences of the Blitz on gendered, working class subjectivity, he argued:
It is hard for an average well-educated, reasonably well-off member of the 
middle classes to appreciate the completeness of the shock to an uneducated 
working-class housewife of a bad air raid. She has no country line of retreat, 
no car or immediate spare cash for hotel or train journey. It is not so much the 
actual danger involved that is important. Rather it is the total upheaval of her 
accepted way of life; the disappearance of the fifty-one landmarks of daily life 
which to her have been unalterable, part of the universe, inherent in living ... 
all these things have been part of the foundation of her life; she has accepted 
them with almost as little question as primitive man accepted the force of gravity. 
The disappearance of them overnight is a shattering psychological blow (2–3).22
Morale pedagogy was one strategy to fortify the civilian population. In this, it was constitutive 
of a process of informal education whereby citizens would come to be installed with a template 
for conduct so that they might come to know how to behave post-Blitz. In knowing ‘what to 
do’, the civilian population was to be supplied with a defence from the shattering psychological 
blows consequent on the total upheaval of ordinary life (3):23
A nation-wide campaign of blitz education for the coming winter should be 
undertaken. In every possible target area people should be pre-educated on the 
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possible developments and how they should react to them. Existing and shadow 
arrangements for feeding, rest centres, evacuation and education should be 
publicised and registered in every citizen. Strong propaganda should be used to 
make it clear that these services are here to be used, and that they are designed 
for the benefit of the citizens (MO 1941, #785–6: 26).
However, it can be seen that even here another strategy was also present, one that did not 
seek to get a hold of the population through pedagogical means, but through the materiality 
that conditioned life post-Blitz. As Harrisson put it, this concerned those practices that directed 
attention to the ‘material activities necessary for restoring some sort of shape to life after a 
blitz’ (MO 1941, #926: 6). That is, those practices that sought to get a hold of the civilian 
population via the milieu.
In MO’s report on the blitzed city of Coventry, MO analysts urged authorities to attend 
not only to those injured or killed by air raids, but to pay a greater level of attention to the 
homeless, and more again to the ‘much larger group’ who were not materially affected by the 
bombing but were who were (profoundly and understandably) ‘immensely upset’ (MO 1940, 
#495: 3). The report urged that the State provide assistance to these individuals, ‘linking them 
up again to the outside world, from which they are otherwise severed from lack of transport, 
lack of telephones, destruction of local press, destruction of electricity and thus of many radio 
sets’; the report criticized the fact that ‘there were virtually no buses running’ even though 
the streets had been cleared of debris with great efficiency; it suggested morale would be 
strengthened if ‘mobile canteens which had been waiting outside the town had come moving in 
through the streets’ (4, 5, 7). In MO reports on blitzed cities, the number of recommendations 
which relate to circulation is striking. In foregrounding the movement of bodies, commodities 
and communications and exhorting their urgent restoration as part of the rehabilitation of 
blitzed cities, the importance of these flows in conditioning the terrain in which morale was 
determined is revealed.24
In intervening in blitzed urban centres the management of morale was to be folded 
into a form of social governance that sought to act on the population via its milieu. While 
these strategies were deployed simultaneously with those that addressed the population as 
a public, they worked not through persuasive appeal, but by interventions into the movement 
of bodies and things so as to secure their circulation and – consequently but indirectly – lift 
morale by securing the materialities of the population’s existence. In this regard, although 
working alongside strategies designed to fortify ‘the public mind’, such interventions were 
not concerned directly with the installing of a template of conduct for the civilian or, critically, 
‘the blitzed-self’; but rather ensuring the security of vital infrastructure in emergency so as to 
maintain as much as possible the circulation of bodies and resources post-Blitz.
Conclusion 
The atmospheric metaphors which opened this paper – ‘a weather-map of popular feeling’; a 
‘war barometer’ – are among many such metaphors encountered throughout MO’s writing on 
morale.25 We are intrigued by this meteorological language – the climatic nature of MO’s morale 
commentary – which operated as a rhetorical device for MO to powerfully illustrate an affective 
atmosphere produced by the morale of the population. It performed this work robustly, for in 
recommending that the government adopt a ‘war barometer’ – an instrument to measure and 
monitor atmospheric pressure – MO was able to present morale as an object of knowledge 
quite literally. The regular morale reports MO produced out of its fieldwork and museological 
collecting and collating practices were part of what Rodney Harrison has identified as MO’s 
greatest innovation, its emphasis on ‘new, collectivized forms of self-knowledge which sought 
to make the population self-governing’ (2014: 242, emphasis in original).
In this way MO’s presentation of an affective atmosphere posited morale as a reality, 
autonomous from those who would study it. However MO’s evocations of an affective atmosphere 
also pertained to morale as it was realized as a field of intervention. In particular, the affective 
atmosphere seemed to gesture towards elements of Foucault’s formulation of the milieu, 
which is ‘a set of natural givens—rivers, marshes, hills’ as well as ‘a set of artificial givens’; 
which we have seen is defined as ‘a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all 
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who live in it’ (2007: 21). On the one hand, an atmospherics of morale facilitated bio-political 
endeavours, for example, to protect and re-channel the energy of bodies, but there was also a 
second, critical dimension involved. MO analysis repeatedly acknowledged the weather itself 
as a powerful factor influencing the morale of the population at any given moment.26
Thus MO’s meteorological formulation of morale was not strictly metaphorical, since social 
atmospherics were correlated to physical atmospherics. While it did not – could not – arrest 
the preponderance of MO’s attention and form a key plank of its advisory output, it functioned 
to limit the influence of the political elite. MO was extremely forthcoming in acknowledging 
the principal, untouchable affect of the skies above: ‘Weather is more important than Winston’ 
(MO 1941, #568: 70). The affective atmosphere was a climactic mode of expression for MO’s 
dialogue with the wartime Ministry of Information. In evoking meteorology MO not only evoked 
morale as a domain that can be governed - it also allowed MO to make an inscription within 
this domain of contingency: of uncertainty and unpredictability, of the ungovernable and the 
unmanageable. Perhaps, too, it opened space for the inscription of civilian voices within 
centres of calculation, which registered the panic evacuations, hysteria and neurosis of blitzed 
populations as symptoms of radical contingency. As Harrisson plainly recorded: ‘This disaster 
comes from the skies, in a random ‘senseless’ way, which seems basically insane to many 
working people’ (MO 1941, #926: 5).
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Notes
1 On ‘atmosphere’ as the ambience in which one feels the affects of others, see Brennan 
(2004: 1).
2 For a discussion of this dimension of liberal rule in the context of native policy, see Dibley 
(2014).
3 Hubble (2006: 167) observes that the first MO report for the MoI in September 1939 was 
on the subject of Ministry posters. It appears that it was not until 30 April 1940 that MO 
started to produce dedicated reports on general morale (MO 1941, #568: 68), and on 18 
May 1940 the organization commenced a series of daily morale reports which later evolved 
into weekly reports.
4 For historical overviews of MO, see Lander and Brook (no date), Jeffrey (1978), Calder 
(1985), Summerfield (1985), Pickering and Chaney (1986), Marcus (2001), Highmore 
(no date; 2002) and Hubble (2006). For a biography of Harrisson, see Heimann (1998). 
Also see Harrisson’s own narrative of the history and operations of the organization in a 
transcript for a radio ‘broadcast for Far East’ entitled ‘Mass-Observation & How It Works’ 
(MO 1942, #1025: 1). It should be noted that the undertaking of this work with the MoI 
was controversial within MO ranks. It was the final straw for Madge, who parted company 
with Harrisson and MO, and took up work with Keynes at the Treasury. See Hubble (2001; 
2006: 196).
5 Hubble (2006: 166–87) offers a close chronological account of the contracts and arrangements 
between MO and the MoI for this period. The professional relationship between the two 
organizations was not straightforward, and the commissioning of MO (for morale and other 
work) proceeded in a sporadic and intermittent fashion. Hubble describes how Harrisson 
carried out this work while engaging in ongoing negotiations to secure future work with the 
Ministry, and clarifies that while MO worked in various capacities for the Ministry for the 
first two years of WWII, the organization was ‘only under a full-time contract from 6 April 
1940 to 30 September 1941’ (174, 187).
6 For a related discussion of the ways in which anthropological experts and practices of 
collection were imbricated in relations of government see Bennett, Dibley and Harrison 
(2014). Also see Dibley (2005).
34
7 This phrase is from a MO File Report (MO 1940, #286: 12).
8 While italics have been retained, emphasis such as underlining and capitalization has been 
omitted from the quotations of MO archival material throughout this paper.
9  In The Insecurity of Territory Paul Virilio writes: ‘Total war was a threshold for our civilization 
to the extent that it was the first global aerial war’ (cited in James 2007: 78).
10 For a history of the MoI see McLaine (1979). On centres of collection and calculation see 
Latour (1987: chapter 6) and Miller and Rose (2008: chapter 2).
11 The same document reported the problem faced by the MoI as ‘one of the deepest and 
most complex … in the world to-day; the problem of understanding and getting into contact 
with the underlying mass ideas of ultra-civilised working men’ (MO 1940, #298: 11). The 
implication here would seem to be that beneath the surface of ‘the ultra-civilised’ lies 
an irrational, primitive depth. The establishment of a primitive structure as the kernel of 
modern subjectivity is a key development for British Freudians. It might be said that this 
relativizing gesture – that moderns and non-moderns share a primitive kernel of subjectivity 
– established a connection between the knowledge practices of MO and formulations of 
colonial governmentality. See note 26.
12 Freud, it will be recalled, was the self-described ‘conquistador’ who discovered the workings 
of that great ‘dark continent’, the unconscious. Gurney (1997: 288) has suggested that 
Freud’s 1921 work Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego ‘uncritically adopted 
many of [Gustave] Le Bon’s ideas, including the supposed similarity between the “group 
mind” and “the mental life of primitive people and of children”’ The relationship between 
‘the public mind’ of MO and the ‘group mind’ of Freud and Le Bon may repay attention. Le 
Bon and Freud’s work on crowds would also bear upon the critical importance of crowds for 
MO, among whose files can be located at least two reports filed by participant observers 
at political rallies, celebrating ‘group feeling’ and ‘the crowd as a united whole’ (MO 1940, 
#345: [1]), and defining ‘a successful mass meeting’ as one where there is ‘only one type 
of person; the type for which the meeting has its message’ (MO 1940, #298: 9).
13 For a critical engagement of MO’s methodology by a contemporary, see Firth (1939).
14 Liz Stanley described Mass-Observation as ‘a radical social science research organization 
on the borders and “other” to institutionalised sociology’ (2008: 536). See Osborne and 
Rose (1999) for conceptual distinctions between the notion of ‘opinion’ and ‘attitude’ in 
the British social sciences of the 1930s and 1940s. For an account of the development of 
MO methods in relation to the emergence of various disciplinary formations in the British 
social sciences see Stanley (2001; 2008). For accounts of the development of the social 
survey see Bulmer (1985), Bulmer, Bales and Sklar (1991) and Osborne and Rose (1997). 
For key statements on ‘public opinion’ in social theory see Habermas (1970) and Bourdieu 
(1990). See Savage (2008; 2010) for an account of how technical expertise associated 
with the social sciences correlated with the rise of a technical class-fraction in post-war 
Britain. This was a movement in which he attributes MO a not insignificant role.
15 In Harrisson’s work, the political elite are repeatedly upbraided for their disconnection with 
‘that vast majority’ of the population that ‘left school at 14’ (MO 1939, #A16: 3). George 
Orwell displayed a certain ambivalence towards MO’s vigorous criticism of the ruling classes, 
implying there may be certain ideological blind spots in the organization’s conception of 
civil society. Orwell ([1940] 1998: 17) suggests that just as MO’s first publication May the 
Twelfth failed to register the existence of any ‘royalist sentiment’ in Britain at all, War Begins 
at Home is similarly unperceptive, as ‘the one thing that the compilers do not seem to have 
encountered is the sentiment of patriotism’.
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16 The emotions and dispositions referred to here are sourced from a major MO report 
submitted to Home Intelligence’s Mary Adams (1941, #568: 3, [72], 58, 56, 56, [84]).
17 The close correlation suggested in this paragraph between the notions of Foucault’s bio-
power and Marx’s labour-power is drawn from Virno (2004: 81–4). For another example of 
a bio-political intervention in the interests of efficiency, see Jones (2006) on government 
and industry measures to protect productivity levels from the interruptions caused by air 
raid warnings.
18 See, for example, ‘Report on Female Attitude to Compulsion’ (MO 1941, #919) and ‘Man-
Power and Conscription’ (MO 1941, #1009).
19 The case for compulsory fire-spotting was taken to the public sphere. In a draft for an article 
to appear in the Tribune, an MO author argued that ‘when it comes to securing effective 
action in the middle of the greatest war in history it is sometimes better to make people’s 
minds up for them on the major questions of policy’. Lamenting the cost of having failed to 
institute compulsory forms of fire-watching the article continued: ‘Large parts of the cities 
of London and Manchester have already been burnt down for the sake of the voluntary 
principle. How much more damage is it to be allowed to do?’ (MO 1941, #916: 1–2). 
20 Bennett (2009; 2013) deploys this distinction between public and milieu to investigate how 
museum/field relations are implicated in modes of government that target colonial and 
metropolitan populations in distinctly different ways. The contention of this paper is that the 
strategies of the public and the milieu are simultaneously directed at the same population, 
in this case, the working-class inhabitants of provincial cities.
21 In the introduction to a collection of daily and weekly morale reports by the MoI’s Home 
Intelligence division from Britain’s Public Record Office, Addison notes that MO’s reports 
on ‘conditions in the immediate aftermath of air-raids … are strongly reflected in Home 
Intelligence reports for the winter of 1940–41’ (1979: [n.p.]). See also Harrisson’s ([1976] 
2010) retrospective analysis of the Blitz.
22 For an account of class differences and ‘social climbing’ by Harrisson, see his essay ‘Notes 
on Class Consciousness and Class Unconsciousness’ (1942). On women’s war experience, 
see Sheridan’s anthology of excerpts from women’s MO diaries and responses (2000). 
Within MO’s volunteer panel, there were intersecting tensions around questions of class 
and gender, with Sheridan remarking on the ‘class snobbery’ that can be seen in the writing 
of some (primarily middle-class) MO correspondents (10).
23 There are parallels here between the description of ‘the shock’ of the air raid as a ‘shattering 
psychological blow’ and the impact of colonization on the indigene and the radical upheaval 
of the native quotidian. Here, similarly, those figured with limited material and intellectual 
resources were posited as vulnerable to psychological collapse in the face of crisis. The link 
here is W. H. R. Rivers, whose work on ‘culture contact’ in Melanesia and on shell-shock 
in WWI soldiers established a universal primitive core to subjectivity that was revealed, 
and to which subjects reverted, in times of extreme crisis. See Kuklick (1991).
24 MO reports also identified ‘positive correlation between the survival of working class leisure 
institutions and high civilian morale’ (Beaven and Griffiths 1999: 82). In relation to the 
deployment of leisure infrastructure, however, MO again found post-Blitz governance wanting. 
For example, one report noted that ‘in post-blitz situations the function of entertainment in 
keeping up morale has sometimes been vigorously ignored. In one city the Chief Constable 
compulsorily closed every place of entertainment, including private dances, after some 
raids’ (MO [1941], Home Propaganda: 47). Hence, the report recommended that, if the pub 
wasn’t damaged, it ought to be open, and, in so doing, involves the bio-politics of soporifics 
in the management of civilian morale. Beaven and Griffiths (1999) also investigate drinking 
and high morale as reported by MO.
36
25 For example: ‘The atmosphere of ordinary Britain’ is set against the Minister of Information 
Mr. Duff Cooper’s ‘atmosphere’ of ‘Downing Street and Dorchester’ (MO 1940, #286: 12); 
air raid evacuees are described as ‘carry[ing] with them...an atmosphere of having come 
from a sort of inferno’ (MO 1940, #449: 7); and one report ruefully lamented ‘the dull dull 
grey which everyday is gradually becoming’ (MO 1940, #508: 4).
26 The organization’s 1942 publication People in Production registered the critical significance 
of the weather for morale: ‘in detailed morale studies made by Mass-Observation over the 
past two years, we have found that over a period of time the two things which have most 
important bearing on short-term depression and cheerfulness are weather and health’ (MO 
1942, People in Production: 203). War news follows these two factors in the short term, 
although it is clarified that ‘in the end cumulatively it naturally outweighs the others’.
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